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A common claim in the literature of expatriation is the one referring to the high costs of 
expatriation. In this paper, on the basis of transaction cost literature, we show how limited this 
approach is. In particular, we 'consider a set of costs that, although ignored in traditional 
expatriation literature, must be accounted for when an MNC is deciding on whether to recruit 
expatriates or local managers in its subsidiaries. These costs include selection, training and 
performance evaluation costs. We also formulate a series of hypotheses around the situations in 
which the total costs of recruiting expatriates are lower than those generated by local managers. We 
them test these hypotheses in a sample of 124 SpaniSh MNCs. The results of the study allow us to 
explain the apparent contradiction that, although businesses have a need to reduce costs, they 
continue to employ apparently costly practices such as expatriation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the key decisions that multinational companies must make is whether to 
select local or expatriate personnel to manage their foreign subsidiaries. In the face of 
this choice, the predominant trend in MNCs seems to be ethnocentric (Maryhofer and 
Brewster, 1996). This effectively is the case in Japanese companies, in which, according 
to a survey by Koop (1994), 75% of their subsidiaries' directors are expatriates. But it is 
also the case in European and U.S. MNCs, in which expatriates occupy 54% and 51 % 
of senior management posts, respectively. 
Although the ethnocentric orientation is predominant in MNCs, there are certain 
obvious problems associated with it. It is noted, for example, that it creates problems of 
adaptability to foreign environments and cultures, leads to high failure rates, has a 
discouraging effect on local management morale and motivation, increases the 
"foreignness" of the subsidiary, and may involve high transfer and salary costs. As 
regards the latter problem, international assignments seem to be an "expensive" option 
for an enterprise. It is estimated that for more than 75% of companies, the costs of 
expatriates amount to more than 3 times that of local employees (The Conference Board 
Europe, 1996). 
If we focus only on costs, we must ask ourselves the following question: If local 
personnel are a much cheaper recruitment option, then why is it that, in a business 
context defined by the need to cut costs, multinational companies continue to make such 
intensive use of international assignments? 
This paper analyzes this question from the perspective of the transaction cost theory. 
After explaining why this theoretical perspective is particularly suited to examining this 
question, we analyze the overall costs, above and beyond the purely salary-related costs 
to which traditional expatriate literature limits its attention, that are implicit III 
management personnel recruiting in subsidiaries, and we formulate a series of 
hypotheses around the situations in which the total costs of recruiting expatriates are 
lower than those generated by local managers. We then test these hypotheses in a 
sample of 124 Spanish MNCs. The results of the empirical study lead us to conclude 
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that in MNCs that have a limited international base, are not very innovative and have 
adopted a global strategy, the expatriate solution can prove to be a more cost-effective 
staffing option. 
TRANSACTION COSTS AND STAFFING DECISIONS IN MNCs 
The question we pose in this paper is why, in a business context where the pressures 
to cut costs are steadily increasing, do MNCs continue to use the apparently costly 
solution of sending expatriates to their international operations? In other words, why do 
they rely on the organization and not the local job market to recruit management 
personnel for the subsidiary? 
Thus posed, the question is similar to the one raised by Coase (1937), which laid the 
foundations for the theory of transaction costs (TCT): if markets are so efficient in 
making transactions, why do organizations exist? The similarity between the two 
questions is not purely accidental. As Willianson states (1990), the TCT can be applied 
to any situation in which an exchange takes place. 
In the case that interests us here, this exchange is the one defined by an employment 
relation in a multinational subsidiary. In this relationship, the employee contributes 
human capital and behavior (Wright et aI., 1994) in exchange for a series of rewards. By 
human capital, we refer to the knowledge, experience, skills and abilities inherent in the 
employee. We also include behavior because, as Wright et al (1994) assert, employee 
human capital does not provide value to the firm unless it is utilized through employee 
behavior. The question is whether the employee is from Headquarters or, conversely, 
whether he/she is recruited from the local market. 
This employment relation is characterized by two factors that make it a complex type 
of exchange. On one hand, unlike virtually instantaneous transactions (e.g., when the 
subsidiary acquires furniture for its offices), the employment relation is long term. 
Secondly the relation is uncertain, as many contingencies may arise throughout its 
duration. 
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From the organization's perspective, the potential problem it faces is that this 
exchange may not be efficient, i.e. if the people selected do not have the required 
human capital or do not display the appropriate behavior. For those who must make the 
recruiting decision, this problem is a possibility due to the convergence of two factors. 
They are rationally bounded; they have limited information on individuals and cannot 
anticipate everything that might happen throughout the relationship. In addition, 
employees have the potential for acting opportunistically. This is the term, which 
according to Moran and Ghoshal (1996) constitutes the vision of this theory with regard 
to human nature. Willianson uses it to refer to types of behavior such as lying, stealing, 
cheating and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disagree, obfuscate or otherwise 
confuse (Willianson, 1985). In our context, it means that prospective employees may try 
to hide information that reveals they do not have the knowledge, experience and skills 
required for the job andlor behave incongruously with the organization's objectives. 
According to Willianson and Ouchi (1981), not all individuals are opportunistic, but 
some are. The problem is that it is practically impossible to separate a priori those who 
are from those who are not. 
Increasing the effectiveness of this employment relation will result in transactions 
costs for the organization (Jones and Wright, 1992). These refer to the costs incurred to 
ensure that the employee meets the requirements for the job and, once recruited, to 
provide incentives and ensure that he/she behaves as desired. Since we are analyzing the 
employment relation, we will call these transaction costs "employment costs". 
Therefore, employment costs are the negotiation and monitoring costs required to 
ensure that the employment relation is forthcoming. 
On the basis of Jones and Wright (1992), we can associate these employment costs 
with specific human resource policies. This will give us four basic types of costs: 
1. Selection and recruitment costs. These are all costs incurred by the organization 
on negotiating with the subsidiary's prospective managers and overcoming 
adverse selection. This issue concerns the tendency of prospective employees to 
overemphasize the level of knowledge, experience and skills they possess m 
order to maximize their returns from the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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2. Training and socialization costs. These are the costs associated with developing 
the skills and competencies of.the subsidiary's managers, and with learning the 
organization's rules, values, policies and procedures. 
3. Compensation cots. These are costs targeted at attracting, retaining and 
motivating the subsidiary's managers. 
4. Costs of monitoring and evaluating the subsidiary's managers. These are the 
costs the organization would incur on verifying that behavior is not opportunistic. 
These would include costs of visits of HQ managers to the subsidiary, managerial 
time spent on supervision, and costs of implementing appraisal and feedback 
systems. 
The basic premise of transaction cost economics is that transactions will tend to take 
place in a manner that minimizes the combined costs of the transaction. If we apply this 
thesis to our scenario, we see that, when deciding whether to recruit a local manager or 
an expatriate, the organization will consider the total transaction costs associated with 
each of these two options and will choose the most effective one (the one that 
minimizes these costs). 
This opens up the possibility that, if we do not confine our attention to salary-based 
costs, expatriates may represent a more cost-effective staffing option in certain 
situations. The question then can be posed as follows: When are the employment costs 
of using expatriates lower than those of using local nationals? 
Figure 2 shows the model that allows us to respond to this question. It includes the 
transaction costs that must be considered when deciding between expatriate or local 
managers, the employment characteristics that determine whether these costs will be 
higher or lower, and the situational factors that, in turn, influence these characteristics. 
In each situation, the organization will consider the benefits of each option, net of their 
respective transactions costs, and adopt the one it deems most effective. 
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In addition to salary costs, we have included selection, training and evaluation costs 
as part of employment costs, dividing them into "a priori", which are those costs 
incurred to ensure that the individual has the required human capital, and "a posteriori", 
the purpose of which is to motivate and assure the desired behavior. 
Figure 1: A model of the recruitment decision in MNCs 
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By employment relation characteristics, we refer to a series of factors that, as we will 
indicate below, influence the sum of the transaction costs. These factors are as follows: 
1. Information asymmetries: this is the extent of the knowledge the organization has 
on the candidate's qualifications and potential behavior. The less information it 
has, the greater will the efforts be that it must make to negotiate with candidates 
and overcome adverse selection (the greater will the selection costs be). 
2. The firm's specific knowledge: this is the extent of the knowledge the candidate 
must possess on the organization's procedures, management policies or culture. 
If this knowledge is important, the organization will have to incur training and 
socialization costs in order for the individual to acquire these specific skills. 
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3. Opportunism: this is the degree of trust the organization has in the extent to 
which the candidate will meet the terms of the agreement. The lower this level of 
trust is (the higher the expectations are of opportunistic behavior by the 
candidate), the higher will the cost of evaluation be for verifying that the 
candidate's behavior is in line with the organization's objectives. 
It should be noted that these three elements pose fewer problems in the case of 
expatriates. Expatriates tend to be recruited from the organization proper (Nauman, 
1992; Maryhofer and Brewster, 1996). This means that, on one hand, the organization 
already knows their qualifications and performance, at least in its own market, and 
therefore possesses more information on them. Secondly, as they have experience inside 
the firm, they have already acquired the organization's specific knowledge, skills, rules 
and values. Finally, opportunism is influenced by what Moran and Ghoshal (1996) 
describe as the "feeling for the entity", which represents the individual's assessment of 
the organization. In the case of subsidiary managers, expatriates are usually trustworthy 
employees who are assigned to foreign operations to represent the organization's 
interests (Nhoria and Ghoshal, 1994). This means that they are employees who have 
internalized the organization's rules and values, and thus Headquarters can be sure that 
their behavior will be instrumental (not opportunistic). Consequently, in those situations 
in which these three elements are most important, it can be assumed that the 
organization will choose to recruit expatriates. 
In our model, we have also indicated four situational factors that influence the 
relative importance of each of these elements. These factors are the level of the 
company's international expansion, their focus on innovation, the type of international 
strategy used, and the cultural distance between Headquarters and the subsidiary. As 
these factors influence employment characteristics, they affect the sum of employment 
costs and, accordingly, the recruitment option (expatriate versus local national). We 
formulate below a series of hypotheses regarding the most economically effective 
recruiting option in each of these situations. 
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Extent of International Expansion 
The literature has noted a series of advantages involved in using local managers, 
including the following: (1) They speak the language, understand the culture and local 
political system, and generally belong to the social elite of the subsidiary's country, 
which allows them to improve market penetration and eliminate the adaptation 
problems of expatriates and their families (Ramil, 1989); (2) They provide for 
continuity of the subsidiary's management and thus avoid frequent expatriate 
substitutions, often accompanied by unjustified management changes in the subsidiary; 
(3) They allow for major salary cost savings, thus providing a margin to pay premiums 
that attract the best local candidates; (4) They enhance motivation and career 
opportunities oflocal personnel, since the subsidiary's senior management positions are 
not reserved for headquarter employees; (5) They increase the firm's acceptance in the 
target country. Local governments and organizations often argue that foreign employees 
take away jobs from local citizens. This point of view is the basis for legislative 
initiatives that require multinationals to establish joint ventures with local enterprises or 
limit the number of foreigners in the subsidiary (Grosse and Kujawa, 1988); (6) Locals 
represent the subsidiary's viewpoints and conditions in the headquarters' decision 
making processes. 
Let us assume that the firm, having become convinced of these advantages, decides 
to recruit local managers. Now the question is: how does it recruit them? If the 
company is a newcomer on the international scene, its lack of knowledge of local job 
markets and the fact that it does not have a base of local candidates that already work in 
the company make this a risky, debatable recruiting option. In order to overcome 
adverse selection and reduce information asymmetries, it will have to invest more time 
and resources in the selection of possible candidates (trips to the subsidiary's country, 
managers' time spent on this task, ads, employment agency expenses, checks that the 
candidates fulfill qualification requirements, etc.). Furthermore, local recruited 
candidates may have to familiarize themselves with the company's products and 
procedures, which will require an investment in their training and socialization with the 
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resulting costs. Finally, to prevent potential opportunism of "unknown" people already 
in the organization, it will also probably incur higher evaluation costs (frequent trips to 
the subsidiary, closer supervision, design and implementation of aUditing systems, etc.). 
On the other hand, this series of costs are drastically reduced when "trustworthy" 
personnel already working in the firm are recruited, or as the company acquires a higher 
level of international expansion. 
Since the costs of employing local managers tend to decrease as the level of a 
company's international expansion increases, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H 1: The lower the level of a company's international expansion, the more it will use 
expatriates. 
Degree of Technological Innovation 
From the standpoint of the theory of transaction costs applied to the international 
arena (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1991), it could be expected 
that the degree of technological innovation is in some way associated with a greater use 
of expatriates, since they help to mitigate the perceived risk of possible opportunistic 
behavior by non-company people hired from local markets. 
Nevertheless, in a recent work, Baron and Kreeps (1999) explain how an 
organization's degree of technological innovation heavily influences the predominant 
type of jobs in the organization. These authors distinguish between star jobs and 
guardianjobs, and claim that star jobs predominate in very innovative companies. These 
are the jobs in which a bad performance is not too bad, but a good performance is very 
good for the firm. A star job would be one held by a manager who runs a subsidiary that 
has very little dependence on headquarters' products, brand image and procedures, and 
where the essential thing is to develop new products or management processes highly 
tailored to the local market. 
A guardian job is one in which a good performance is only slightly better for the firm 
than an average performance, but a bad performance is a disaster. A guardian job would 
be one held by a manager of a subsidiary whose function is to represent the organization 
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before a series of global customers and in which the organization's reputation is a 
valuable asset. Subsidiary managers in the financial industry typically belong to this 
category. 
The type of job post to be filled affects the time and resources invested in candidate 
selection and evaluation. For a star job, the costs of a hiring error are small relative to 
the upside potential from finding an exceptional individual. Therefore, the organization 
will be less concerned with problems that information asymmetries and opportunism 
could cause during recruiting, and will therefore be willing to assume a higher risk in its 
decisions. On the contrary, in non-innovative organizations in which managers hold 
guardian jobs, it will be essential to ensure that the candidate fulfills the required 
qualifications and that his/her performance is not detrimental to the organization's 
global reputation or image. In this case, the higher salary costs that the company incurs 
on recruiting "trustworthy" employees with a long track record inside the company may 
compensate for the costs that would be involved if the company made a selection error. 
Since the costs of employing local managers tend to decrease as a company's degree 
of technological innovation increases, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: The higher a company's focus on innovation, the less it will use expatriates. 
International Strategy 
There are two basic ways for multinationals to compete on the market: country to 
country, or on a global basis. In the latter case, the MNC's presence in foreign markets 
is often justified by its possession of firm-specific knowledge that provides it with a 
competitive advantage over local firms (Hymer, 1976; Teece, 1986). This advantage 
allows it to offset the disadvantage resulting from its foreign status (compared to local 
enterprises, MNCs are less familiarized with the national culture, the structure of local 
industry and other aspects of doing business in a specific country). On the other hand, 
these MNCs usually maintain a high degree of interdependence between their units, so 
that whatever one unit does impacts the organization's other units. 
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The type of international strategy affects the costs of training, selecting and 
evaluating its subsidiaries' managers. First of all, if the subsidiary competes on the basis 
of standard firm-specific knowledge, it is assumed that the skills of Headquarters' 
employees also apply to the subsidiary. Such knowledge and skills are often only 
obtainable in the firm and only after a long time. Furthermore, the level of knowledge 
about the firm, its operations, its personnel, its traditions, etc., required for higher-level 
positions, such as those considered in our case, is likely to be much greater and 
therefore more costly to acquire (Baron and Kreeps, 1999). Therefore, it is logical and 
rational that the company will want to amortize the training costs of its national 
employees in other destinations, instead of training a new local manager in those skills. 
On the other hand, management jobs in interdependent units generally reqUlre 
making decisions that span other units of the corporation. Therefore, the costs of error 
of those higher up in the hierarchy are very high. This implies a greater aversion to the 
risk involved in recruiting personnel on which less information is available, and also in 
the potential opportunism that this personnel may display. Under these circumstances, 
the higher costs related to expatriate managers may be compensated by the savings 
resulting from lower selection, training and evaluation costs. 
Therefore, smce the costs of employing local managers are higher m global 
strategies, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Companies with a global strategy will make more use of expatriates than 
companies that compete country to country. 
Geographical Area (Cultural Distance) 
A multinational basically has two different but complementary mechanisms available 
to it for controlling its subsidiaries' performance: centralization and formalization. 
Centralization refers to the extent to which decisions, such as new product introduction, 
product design changes or production process changes, are made in headquarters. 
Formalization, on the other hand, depends on the existence of a well-defined set of rules 
and procedures that regulate tasks and the way to react to different situations. This 
mechanism limits a subsidiary's decision-making autonomy, but it also decreases the 
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headquarters' direct involvement in the subsidiaries, as direct control is replaced by 
rules and procedures. 
When there is a great cultural distance between headquarters and the subsidiary, 
these two control mechanisms are not effective, since they amount to a kind of 
straight jacket that prevents the subsidiary from confronting the political, legal, 
economic or cultural complexity of its environment (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). 
To address this issue of control in very culturally distant units, we can propose some 
recruiting options. The cultural difference between Headquarters and Subsidiary 
increases information asymmetries and the potential for opportunism. Therefore, if local 
managers are recruited, the company would incur higher selection, training (e.g., 
sending these managers to Headquarters to improve communications between both 
units) and evaluation costs. On the contrary, the higher salary costs that the company 
would have to pay on sending a "trustworthy" manager to act as an interpreter and 
secure Headquarters' interests in the subsidiary (Boyacilliger, 1990) could offset the 
costs the company would incur to overcome the possibility of opportunism and adverse 
selection. Since the costs of employing local managers tend to increase as the cultural 
distance between Headquarters and Subsidiary increases, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: The greater the cultural distance, the more the organization will use expatriates. 
METHODOLOGY 
TARGET POPULATION OF STUDY AND FINAL SAMPLE 
This work is part of a broader study on internationalization of Spanish enterprises in 
which both exporting firms and multinational companies took part!. Here we will refer 
solely to the subsample of multinational firms. These companies were selected from the 
international files of a database set up by Bun & Bradstreet. This database included 498 
multinational companies whose head offices were 100% Spanish. These companies can 
be considered as the most active Spanish enterprises in international markets. 
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A postal survey was the instrument used to gather information. Questionnaires were 
sent to the selected companies, either addressed to the company presidents or, in some 
cases in which their names were not available, to the head executives. The first mailing 
to all selected companies was made in June, 1997. Within three months we received 74 
replies, after which we again mailed the questionnaires to those companies that had not 
responded. The process was concluded with a total of 134 valid replies, which amounts 
to a real response rate of26.9%. 
V ARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
Dependent Variable 
To determine the extent to which a company is using local or expatriate managers, 
the questionnaire included the following question: "What percentage of managers in 
charge of international operations are Spanish?" In view of the sample distribution 
(Table 1), which shows that most companies are amassed at the two extremes, and 
following the same methodology used in other studies in the field of international 
business (Stop ford and Wells, 1972; Anderson and Coughlan, 1987; Gomes-Casseres, 
1989; Hennart, 1991), we have created a dichotomous variable for which the cutoff 
point was a rate of international managers of Spanish nationality of more than 95%. A 
percentage below the cutoff point means that the company has at times resorted to the 
market to hire managers. A higher percentage means that this function is fully 
internalized in the company. 
% of expatriates 
Between 0-50 
Between 50-95 
More than 95 
TABLE 1: % OF EXPATRIATES 
N 
38 
25 
71 
28.3 
18.6 
52.9 
As we can see, 52.9% of the companies prefer to use expatriates. As we noted in the 
introduction, this high percentage of expatriate use is entirely consistent with results 
obtained in other studies on other nationalities (Koop, 1994). 
1 For a more detailed description of the methodology used, see PIa Barber (1998). 
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Independent Variables 
Level of International Expansion 
Traditionally, the number of subsidiaries and the percent of manufacturing done 
outside the local market have been variables associated with a higher degree of 
corporate development in the international arena (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; 
Luostarinen, 1994). To encourage replies and based on experience gained in previous 
studies indicating a low level of foreign expansion by Spanish companies, we 
introduced the following intervals: 
Analysis Value 
% manufacturing 
abroad 
No. of subsidiaries 
TABLE 2: FOREIGN EXPANSION 
1 2 3 4 
0% Between 1 %-9% Between 10-29% More than 30% 
Between 2 & 5 Between 5 & 10 More than 10 
In order to homogenize both results, we constructed an index (IMPL) for each 
company, based on the sum of the values of the two variables and divided by 2. This 
method of constructing indexes is similar to the one used by Anderson and Coughlan 
(1987) and Kobrin (1994). The alpha coefficient is 0.51, positioned between the 
generally accepted values for the exploratory stages of research (Nunnally, 1978). 
Degree of Technological Innovation 
Based on Kim and Hwang (1992), the innovation variable was measured by an index 
(INNV) constructed in a way similar to the previous case. This variable involves an 
appraisal, on a five-point Likert scale, of the following statements (alpha coefficient: 
0.64): 
• The degree of technological innovation existing in the company. 
• The level of complexity of products/services or processes involved in international 
operations. 
• The innovative level of products/services or processes involved in international 
operations. 
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International Strategy 
In order to measure the global or multi-domestic nature of the international strategy 
guiding company operations (ESTR), and following a methodology similar to the one 
used by Leong and Tan (1993), a dichotomous variable was introduced that very 
concisely reflected the role that foreign subsidiaries play in the company. Managers had 
to choose one of the following two statements; the variable was assigned value 1 if the 
first statement was selected, and value 0 if the second was selected. 
• In my company, activities and innovations developed in subsidiaries are controlled 
to a large extent from central headquarters. 
• In my company, subsidiaries can operate and innovate in their local markets with 
considerable independence from central headquarters. 
Cultural Distance 
The questionnaire identified the first three countries where the company had begun 
its international venture, and also the three most significant countries at the present 
time. In most cases, it is observed that on entering a specific area, the second and third 
targeted markets are concentrated in the same area. Furthermore, in most cases these 
initial markets are currently still the most significant ones. This fact allowed us to 
classify companies within a certain geographical zone where most of its operations were 
concentrated. The following table shows the different categories, and also the number of 
companies included in each one. 
TABLE 3: GEOGRAPIDCAL AREA (Cultural Distance) 
Geographical Area N 
European Union 72 
Rest of Europe 4 
North America (USA and Canada) 13 
Latin America 12 
Africa 1 
Asia 6 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
In order to verify the most significant factors influencing a company's decision to 
recruit local managers or expatriates, and given the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable, logistic regression analysis is used (Table 5). Once the model is 
estimated, the values that this model predicts constitute the probabilities that the option 
defined by the dependent variable will be used. These estimated probabilities follow a 
logistic model exp(z)/(1 +exp(z)), where z is a linear function of the independent 
variables. In each model, the sign of the regression coefficients of the statistically 
significant variables was analyzed. A positive coefficient means that the independent 
variable increases the probability of using expatriates, whereas a negative coefficient 
implies an increased probability of using local managers (Cramer, 1991; Liao, 1994)2. 
2 When variables are categorical, the coefficients of each category should be interpreted in relation to the 
reference category. The coefficient sign will represent the differential effect of this category in relation to 
the omitted one on the probability that the dependent variable will equal 1. 
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TABLE 5: LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
Variables 
IMPL 
INNV 
ESTR 
AREA3 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
CONST 
N 
-2 log likelihood 
R2 
Chi-square 
* p<O.I; **p<0.05; ***p<O.OI 
Level of Expansion 
Innovation 
Global Strategy 
Geographical Area 
European Union 
Rest of Europe 
North America 
Latin America 
-4.317 
Coefficient B 
(Statistical T) 
-1.786*** 
(10.32) 
-0.771 * 
(2.86) 
1.642** 
(5.97) 
7.54 
(0.05) 
7.40 
(0.04) 
7.16 
(0.04) 
7.72 
(0.05) 
7i 
71.3 
0.43 
29.807*** 
As we can see, the regression analysis validates three of the four formulated 
hypotheses. The model, which converges after 7 iterations, is highly explanatory, 
presenting a chi-square of 29.08 (p=0.0001) and a percentage of correctly classified 
cases of79.22%. 
3 The reference variable is Asia (6). 
4 This number, lower than the percentage of replies received, is due to the effect of lost cases, as the 
econometric program eliminates any cases where a gap occurs in any of the dependent variables. 
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All significant variables have the correct sign. As was expected, a higher level of 
international expansion is associated with a greater use of local managers. The IMPL 
coefficient (-1.788) is negative and statistically significant at the level of 0.01. 
Therefore, the likelihood of using expatriates decreases as the number of subsidiaries 
and foreign production increase. 
In addition, a negative (-0.771) and statistically significant (p<O.l) association is 
observed between the use of expatriates and the importance of innovation. It seems that 
when innovation is a major competitive advantage for the company, it tends to be more 
culturally heterogeneous and greater importance is attached to local managers, not only 
so that they can better address market needs, but also contribute new ways of thinking 
and understanding the company. 
This fact is also partially confirmed by the variable that reflects the strategy followed 
by the company. If the subsidiaries depend on and innovations are centralized in the 
head office, there is a tendency to use expatriates (positive, statistically significant sign). 
On the other hand, if the nature of the strategy is multi-domestic, whereby the 
subsidiaries have a certain degree of independence and innovations are usually 
generated in any part of the organization, the proportion of local managers used is 
higher. Therefore, the global strategy proves to be a relevant predictor of the degree of 
internalization of the managerial function in local markets through the use of 
expatriates. 
Finally, the geographical area where the company has most of its operations does not 
influence the decision to use expatriates or local managers. In accordance with these 
findings, we consider that cultural distance may be relevant in early investment 
decisions - where to invest and with what amount of resources, etc. - but once a certain 
amount of experience has been gained this effect diminishes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A common claim in the literature on expatriation is the one referring to the high costs 
of expatriates. In this paper, on the basis of transaction cost literature, we have shown 
how limited this approach is. In particular, we have considered a set of costs that, 
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although ignored in traditional expatriation literature, must be accounted for when an 
MNC is deciding on whether to recruit expatriates or local managers in its subsidiaries. 
These costs include selection, training and performance evaluation costs. We have also 
defended the premise that in companies with a lower level of international expansion, a 
lower degree of technological innovation, a global strategy and operations in very 
culturally distant environments, expatriates can be a cost-effective solution. This 
explains the apparent contradiction, formulated at the beginning of this paper, of how it 
is possible, in a business context defined by the need to reduce costs, that companies 
continue to make intensive use of such an apparently costly solution. 
The empirical investigation has confirmed three of our four hypotheses, which 
illustrates the viability of our approach. The fact that expatriates are more extensively 
used in companies with a global strategy and a low level of international expansion, two 
of our study's findings, is consistent with the findings obtained by Edstrom and 
Galbraith (1977) in the late 70's. On the contrary, the third validated hypothesis in our 
study, i.e. that expatriates are used less in multinational companies with a higher level 
of technological innovation, is a finding that, as far as we know, has not resulted from 
any previous studies on this subj ect. In view of this, the theory of transaction costs not 
only makes it possible to confirm findings already obtained from other theoretical 
perspectives, but also results in new findings that provide sound arguments for 
defending their potential and interest in this area. 
The only unconfirmed hypothesis is the one concerning a diminished use of 
expatriates when companies operate in very culturally distant environments. Instead, we 
have found that, at least in Spanish multinationals, the target country has no influence 
on the recruitment option. A possible reason for this is that the importance of cultural 
distance starts decreasing as the company acquires a solid international presence. In this 
case, and in line with what we have defended in this work, information asymmetries and 
opportunism, two of the factors that generate higher or lower employment costs, are 
reduced. Companies with a solid international base have already acquired information 
on how to operate in local job markets, and they also have a local personnel base in their 
subsidiaries to select the more trustworthy individuals. 
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The study has some limitations. First of all, we recognize that our framework may be 
incomplete. Other transaction costs that have not been identified may also be significant 
to the employment relation in a subsidiary of an MNC (e.g., the costs of enforcing 
contracts). Secondly, the existence of transaction costs associated with the recruitment 
decision in multinationals helped us formulate the hypotheses tested in the empirical 
investigation, but they were not specifically measured. In this respect, we understand 
that this study is of a merely exploratory nature and should be complemented by other 
future studies to fill this gap. 
In spite of these limitations, we consider that the study points up some interesting 
elements that do more than shed some light on the apparent contradiction mentioned 
above. In the first place, the study establishes and explains, from a sound theoretical 
perspective, an area of management (i.e., expatriate management) that tends to be 
criticized as a merely descriptive field lacking in analytical rigor. Secondly, it not only 
integrates a specific international human resource management decision with the 
company's international strategy, but also jointly considers different human resources 
policies or decisions; in particular, it demonstrates the influence that other human 
resource decisions, such as training, compensation and performance evaluation, have on 
the selection decision. Therefore, it involves the two types of integration (external and 
internal) that are usually attributed to human resource policies in order for them to be 
considered strategic. As the need to introduce the "strategic" point of view in expatriate 
management is a claim made by several authors (Schuler, et al., 1993; Taylor et aI., 
1996), we consider that this work also makes a contribution in this direction. 
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